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Abstract
In most rich democracies one finds a tendency for the share in public finance that is 
available for discretionary spending to shrink. This is because tax revenues do not 
keep pace with simultaneous increases in fixed expenditures and growing pressures 
for fiscal consolidation. The present paper assesses the capacity of governments un-
der conditions of fiscal austerity to shift financial resources within the shrinking 
share of discretionary expenditure from old to new purposes, and thereby fund 
future-oriented investment aimed at making societies more equitable and efficient. 
For this reason an indicator for soft public investment is developed, which includes 
public spending on education, R&D, family support, and active labor market policy. 
We present data for Germany, Sweden, and the United States for the years 1981 to 
2007 in order to explore the general dynamics of consolidation policies under the 
expectation that far more ambitious consolidation attempts will be made in the 
coming decade. Our results suggest that the capacity of governments to shift re-
sources towards soft public investment decreases as pressures for fiscal consolida-
tion increase.
Zusammenfassung
In den meisten reichen Demokratien lässt sich die Tendenz ausmachen, dass der Anteil 
diskretionärer Ausgaben an den öffentlichen Haushalten zurückgeht. Ursächlich dafür 
ist, dass die Steuereinnahmen nicht hoch genug sind, um die parallele Zunahme ge-
bundener Ausgaben sowie den gestiegenen Konsolidierungsdruck auffangen zu können. 
Das Papier untersucht, inwiefern Regierungen unter den Bedingungen fiskalischer Aus-
terität in der Lage sind, finanzielle Mittel innerhalb des diskretionären Ausgabenanteils 
von alten zu neuen Aufgaben zu verschieben. Dies betrifft insbesondere die Finanzie-
rung zukunftsorientierter Investitionen, die darauf abzielen, Gesellschaften gerechter 
und effizienter zu gestalten. Zu diesem Zweck wird ein Indikator für „weiche“ öffent-
liche Investitionen entworfen, der Ausgaben für Bildung, Forschung und Entwicklung, 
Familienunterstützung und aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik enthält. Angesichts der Erwar-
tung weit ambitionierterer Konsolidierungsversuche im kommenden Jahrzehnt werden 
auf der Basis von Daten für Deutschland, Schweden und den Vereinigten Staaten für 
die Jahre 1981 bis 2007 allgemeine Dynamiken der Konsolidierungspolitik herausge-
arbeitet. Die Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass die Fähigkeit von Regierungen, mehr 
Ressourcen für „weiche“ Investitionen bereitzustellen, in dem Maße abnimmt, wie der 
Konsolidierungsdruck zunimmt.iv  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
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Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment: 
Is the Possible the Enemy of the Necessary?
1 Introduction
In previous work we have shown how fiscal austerity in rich democracies may be ac-
companied by an increase in mandatory, or fixed, expenditure and a decline of the share 
of public spending over which governments and legislators have discretion (Streeck/
Mertens 2010b). For example, in Germany the share of the federal budget that was 
left after politically or legally inflexible expenditure on personnel, defense, debt service, 
social assistance, and social security1 declined between 1970 and 2008 from 40 to 22 
percent (Streeck/Mertens 2010b: 14). The decline was paralleled by a steady increase in 
public debt during the same period.
If there is indeed a tendency for the share in public finance that is available for discre-
tionary spending to shrink (Steuerle 1996; Cordes 1996; Pierson 2001; Rose 1990; Rose/
Davies 1994), this must raise the question of how long governments will continue to be 
able to fund future-oriented public investment in response to changing social needs or 
aimed at making societies more equitable and efficient. With pressures for fiscal consol-
idation increasing, debt servicing becoming more expensive – at least potentially – and 
the “immovable objects” (Pierson 1998) of public policy claiming a growing percentage 
of stagnant or even declining tax revenues, maintaining the level of public investment – 
never mind increasing it – would require shifting resources within the shrinking share 
of discretionary expenditure from old to new purposes. The aim of this paper is to as-
sess the capacity of governments to do this.
2  Public investment: “Hard” and “soft”
Not all that is left in public budgets after fixed obligations have been met is available for 
public investment. Discretionary spending includes a wide variety of rather idio syncratic 
items that are difficult to classify and often impossible to compare cross-nationally. 
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the “Democracy in Straightjackets: Politics in the 
Age of Permanent Austerity” conference at Ringberg Castle, Germany, in March 2011. We would like 
to thank the participants for their valuable comments.
1  We define “mandatory” as “politically or legally inflexible.” Formally and ultimately, govern-
ments can cut any spending obligation, including pensions and debt servicing. But some items 
are more legally rigid or politically costly to cut than others. Also, what may be discretionary in 
one country may be de facto mandatory in another. For a militarily active superpower such as 
the US, defense spending seems discretionary, while for some of its NATO allies, such as Ger-
many, it is mandated by international agreement, in particular with the United States.2  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
Moreover, public investment, as defined in standardized national account statistics, is 
limited to a country’s physical infrastructure, such as roads, railways, canals, and bridges; 
to capital goods used by government, such as office machinery; and to improving and 
maintaining the existing capital stock – what is technically called “government gross 
fixed capital formation.”2
There are indications that such spending has been in decline for several decades in most 
countries as a result of fiscal pressure. For example, de Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) 
report for the period between 1980 and 1992 a decline in government gross capital 
formation in the great majority of 22 OECD countries, in terms of both GDP and total 
government expenditure. The explanation offered is increasing “fiscal stringency,” as in-
dicated by a country’s cyclically adjusted deficit. Keman (2010), looking at the relation-
ship between public investment and total government outlays between 1992 and 2004, 
finds a further decline for 11 out of 18 OECD democracies, which he explains as “col-
lateral damage” resulting from a general downsizing of government spending. Similarly, 
Breunig and Busemeyer (2010), who use data on 21 OECD countries from 1979 to 2003, 
report a negative impact of fiscal austerity on the share of government spending devot-
ed to public investment, which they account for as a result of a simultaneous increase in 
the share of non-discretionary entitlement spending, in particular on pensions.
Arguably, however, it is not exclusively or even primarily “hard” public investment that 
should be looked at in the context of the social and political effects of fiscal austerity. 
Much of such spending is difficult to compare between countries as it depends on and 
may be required by both natural conditions and a country’s economic development. 
For example, Hungary inevitably spends less on tunnels than Switzerland, and Austria 
less on dams and canals than the Netherlands. More importantly, there are likely to be 
saturation points beyond which further construction is not needed, or may even not 
be desirable for environmental or other reasons.3 We therefore believe that attention 
should be paid primarily to a different sort of public investment which to us seems to 
be of foremost importance for contemporary rich societies. By this we mean not physi-
cal but what we call, for want of a better term, “soft” investment, defined as a specific 
sort of public spending aimed at creating conditions required for the prosperity and 
sustainability of a “post-industrial” or “knowledge society.”4
2  The exact definition of public investment has always been contested. We rely here on OECD 
(2009a: 44).
3  Construction of additional autobahns in Germany would probably add very little to an already 
well-developed infrastructure, not to mention that it might be counterproductive in terms of 
environmental protection.
4  That there is more to public investment than material infrastructure – which would seem to call 
for a wider conceptualization of the term – is increasingly acknowledged. For example, the re-
vised System of National Accounts of 2008 discusses the need to incorporate spending on R&D 
and education in gross fixed capital formation (United Nations et al. 2009: 8, 206). There is also 
the concept of “social investment” (as in Morel/Palier/Palme 2009) which is increasingly being 
used for a new kind of supply side-oriented social policy aimed not at the “de-commodification” 
of labor (through what is called “social consumption”) but at improving its “employability.” We 
believe that “social investment” basically refers to the same thing as our notion of “soft investment.”Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  3
In particular, we distinguish four categories of public spending that we consider soft 
investment in this sense: spending on (i) education, on (ii) research and development, on 
(iii) active labor market policy, and on (iv) families. Spending on education and on re-
search and development supports human capital formation and industrial innovation 
and enhances economic prosperity and, perhaps, social equity. Education also serves 
to help integrate immigrants and their children into the national economy and society. 
Active labor market policy is to improve the “employability” of people at risk of becom-
ing long-term unemployed, mostly by training but also by other measures that promote 
their social and economic inclusion.5 Family policies, finally, are intended to enable 
women to have children while being gainfully employed, and to improve the opportuni-
ties of children from less well-to-do families:
[They] are defined as those policies that increase resources of households with dependent chil-
dren; foster child development; reduce barriers to having children and combining work and 
family commitments; and, promote gender equity in employment opportunities. 
(OECD 2011)
Can democratic countries rededicate fiscal resources while policy legacies endure and 
the means available for government intervention are shrinking? It may matter in this 
context that in no country does soft public investment occupy a large share of govern-
ment spending. For example, in Germany in 2007 the four items we have grouped in 
the category together amounted to roughly 15 percent of total government spending, 
including the federal government, the Länder and local communities. That the share of 
public spending that is devoted to soft investment is relatively small is not necessarily 
bad news: it may mean that skillful governments with enough political willpower might 
be able to protect it from being cut under fiscal stress, or even gradually to increase it 
as other expenditures, among them those on physical infrastructure (see above), have 
to be or can be reduced. If governments were in fact able to shift resources from other 
discretionary items to investment, or perhaps simply from hard to soft investment, fis-
cal stress – as resulting from factors such as political and economic pressures for fiscal 
consolidation, combined with domestic tax resistance and international tax competi-
tion – would at least not completely eliminate the capacity of democratic states to pre-
pare their societies for new collective needs.
5  According to an authoritative International Labour Office source, active labor market policies 
(ALMPs) “contribute to an improvement in the participants’ employability and thus increase 
their re-employment prospects. ALMPs can also be used to achieve greater equity by favoring 
more disadvantaged labour market groups. In addition to these functions, they are also one of 
the imperative measures that help create more income and employability security in times of 
multiple labour market changes” (Auer/Efendioglu/Leschke 2008: 19).4  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
3  Method and case selection
In the present paper we trace the impact of fiscal stress on soft public investment for 
three countries over a period of almost three decades, from 1981 (which is the first year 
for which comparable data are available) to 2007, the year before the “Great Recession.” 
There are several reasons why we have opted for a three-country longitudinal rather 
than a multi-country cross-sectional design. One is that data on soft public investment 
are not easy to compile and compare between countries and over time, especially if one 
lacks detailed information on national institutions and changing accounting practices, 
which can be acquired only for a limited number of cases. Another is that snapshot-
style cross-national comparison, looking at a multitude of countries at a given moment, 
misses the historical dynamics of and interdependencies between the cases under study. 
While it promises to reveal general causal relations of the “If A, then B” sort – a prom-
ise it is, however, very unlikely to keep – it cannot detect the extent to which countries’ 
longer-term trajectories resemble each other. Nor can it determine whether differences 
between countries observed at the time of comparison are due merely to differences in 
the speed and timing of a parallel movement along a common path.
Static comparison fails to do justice to changing historical conditions that affect all 
country cases, such as the end of inflation in the OECD countries and the associated 
general decline in interest rates in the 1980s. Also, the defense of soft investment against 
pressures for austerity, and even more the redirection of resources from old to new 
policy objectives, can only be a long-drawn-out process that must continue over more 
than a few years to produce stable results, and must therefore be observed over a suffi-
ciently long span of time. Similar spending levels may mean different things if spending 
in one country has been declining for years while in the other it has been continuously 
increasing. In fact, whether soft investment is high or low at a given time may be less 
indicative of a country’s capacity for fiscal innovation than whether it is rising or de-
clining. In light of this we have decided to focus on trends rather than conditions, and 
on dynamic rather than static similarities and differences.
The three countries we have selected for our study are Germany, Sweden and the United 
States. Germany, of course, is the country we know best – which, given the institutional 
complexities of fiscal policy, is a good enough reason for including it. More importantly, 
Germany appears on many counts to be a non-exceptional, intermediate, more or less 
average case: the government share in its economy (at 44 percent of GDP in 2007) and 
its level of taxation (40 percent) are neither particularly high nor low by OECD stan-
dards, and the same applies to its public debt (at 65 percent). Still, like most other coun-
tries, public budgets were in deficit most of the time from the early 1970s onward, and 
accumulated debt has risen steadily, provoking public concern and repeated attempts at 
fiscal consolidation, including the social security reforms of the second Schröder gov-
ernment (2002–2005; Streeck 2009).Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  5
Sweden and the United States, by comparison, are extreme cases, at opposite ends of 
the spectrum. Sweden, representing the Scandinavian version of the postwar welfare 
state, continues to be the prototypical high-tax economy (with a government share of 
51 percent and a taxation rate of 49 percent in 2007). In fact, although government 
spending was always very high, public deficits were rare, and in 21 of the 39 years from 
1970 and 2008 the Swedish state ran a budget surplus.6 This did not protect the country 
from fiscal stress, however. While fiscal problems in Germany have accumulated slowly 
and steadily since the 1970s, with budget deficits almost every year, Sweden suffered two 
dramatic crises, one in 1982 and the other in 1992–93. Both crises instantly produced 
extremely high public deficits followed, however, by aggressive and highly successful 
efforts at fiscal consolidation, especially in the 1990s. Whereas the level of taxation has 
recently declined – in 1990 it was as high as 53 percent of GDP, and in 2000 it was 52 per-
cent – it is, at 49 percent, still higher than in most other countries. Government indebt-
edness, for its part, has returned to a relatively low level (48 percent of GDP in 2007).
As to the United States, the country traditionally figures as the prime example of a 
modern economy with low government spending (37 percent of GDP in 2007), low 
taxation (28 percent), and a very small, “liberal” welfare state. Unlike Sweden, and more 
than Germany, tax resistance is high and government social intervention of almost any 
sort is not popular. Nevertheless, fiscal stress has been endemic since the end of infla-
tion in the early 1980s, with huge deficits in the federal budget and a high public debt 
due to stagnant growth, repeated tax cuts, and occasional invasions of far-away coun-
tries. Renewed economic growth in the 1990s and a policy of austerity aimed at budget 
consolidation resulted in momentary surpluses which, however, were soon wiped out 
by further tax cuts and the rising cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2007, 
government debt was at 62 percent of GDP, having been as low as 55 percent in 2001. 
Also, non-discretionary mandatory expenditure not including defense had increased to 
66 percent of tax revenue, compared to 39 percent in 1970. Counting defense as non-
discretionary, the mandatory share of the American federal budget in 2007 amounted 
to roughly 85 percent of tax revenue. For 2010, it was forecast in the spring of that year 
to rise, in the wake of the “great recession,” to an astonishing 140 percent (Streeck/
Mertens 2010a).
In the following we will analyze the development of soft public investment under fiscal 
stress in Germany, Sweden and the United States during the run-up to the financial-
fiscal crisis that began in 2008. The reason why our analysis ends in 2007 is not just 
that the crisis threw public finances in deep disarray for the foreseeable future, for a 
majority of advanced countries. More importantly, the period that began in the mid-
1990s was one of a sustained endeavor throughout the OECD countries to consolidate 
government finances. Major efforts were made, under the leadership of the Clinton 
administration and international organizations such as the World Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, to rein in the accumulation of public debt that had begun, at 
6  In Germany this was the case in only five years, and in the United States in only four.6  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
the latest, with the conquest of inflation in the early 1980s. As a matter of fact, public 
debt as a percentage of GDP fell in the United States by 17 percentage points between 
1995 and 2001; by 18 percentage points between 1993 and 2007 in Sweden; and by al-
most 4 percentage points between 2004 and 2007 in Germany (Table 7). While the crisis 
undid most of the achievements of the consolidation policies of this period, politically 
difficult as they undoubtedly were, we consider the fiscal experience of these years to be 
highly indicative of what is to be expected of the era of, inevitably, incomparably stricter 
austerity policies that lies ahead, not least with regard to the fate of public investment 
under fiscal stress.
Another point that we would like to emphasize is that ours is not a study of public fi-
nances per se, or of educational or any other spending. Rather we are interested in the 
development of democratic states’ capacities under conditions of fiscal austerity, which 
is what we must expect in the coming years. Questions that we will address include 
whether a country with traditionally very high and highly redistributive public spending, 
such as Sweden, is likely to be able – going by the experience of the 1990s and 2000s – to 
defend its future-oriented public investment against ever mounting pressures for fiscal 
consolidation and convergence on a more “normal” pattern of public finance, such as 
the German one. We will also explore whether a country such as Germany, tradition-
ally with much lower public investment than Sweden, will have the poli  tical capacity to 
avoid emulating the United States, or whether, to the contrary, it could with any degree 
of realism be expected to develop in a Scandinavian direction, given the widely recog-
nized rising importance of public support for education, research and development, 
work skills, and families. Finally, the United States will serve as a baseline for assessing 
whether traditionally non-liberal capitalist systems, such as Germany and Sweden, may 
be converging under fiscal pressure toward a more liberal pattern of public spending.
4  Variables and data
Soft public investment
In this section we present our data on the four components of what we call “soft public 
investment.” We also discuss how we combine its four categories – spending on educa-
tion, research and development, active labor market policy, and family support – into 
an aggregate measure. Unlike some (Breunig/Busemeyer 2010; Keman 2010), we are not 
interested primarily in the size of public investment expenditure relative to total state ex-
penditure; for our purposes, this is too much influenced by the overall state share in the 
national economy, and makes substantive sense only where budgetary authority is cen-Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  7
tralized.7 Instead, we measure public investment in relation to GDP; in other words, in 
terms of its share in a country’s annual economic output. We believe that this is the best 
way of capturing a state’s real political efforts, certainly comparatively and also over time.8
Education
The main source of data on government expenditure on education is the annual OECD 
publication Education at a Glance (OECD 1992–2010). Drawing in addition on data 
from the OECD’s Public Educational Expenditure 1970–1988 (OECD 1992: 84), we 
were able to compile a longitudinal data set extending from 1981 to 2007. The data re-
flect public expenditure on educational institutions, which is the most consistent time 
series available. It includes all spending by government agencies on teaching, such as 
teachers’ salaries and the costs of teaching materials; buildings; administration; student 
transportation and housing; research and development in higher education; and public 
services provided by educational institutions. Public subsidies to private households 
intended to cover student living costs, such as student loans, are not included;9 neither 
are subsidies to private entities, such as firms, trade unions and churches, unless they 
are in support of apprenticeship programs.
Government expenditure on education is reported to international organizations by 
national statistical and educational offices and jointly compiled by UNESCO, OECD 
and Eurostat (UOE). Considering the scope of our research, two issues arise with the 
definition and coverage of the UOE data. First, the data do not include education-relat-
ed tax reductions. Second, and more importantly, definitions have changed over time, 
which has caused gaps in coverage. Data are missing for 1989, the year before Educa-
tion at a Glance was established (and in the case of Germany, also for 1990, the year of 
unification), and for 1996 when a revised International Standard Classification of Educa-
tion (ISCED 97) was on its way. Although extensive, the revisions do not seem to have 
caused a severe distortion in the overall level of public expenditure on education as 
measured. To make our time series continuous we have chosen to estimate the missing 
values by the arithmetical mean between the two nearest years.
7  Breunig and Busemeyer (2010) use the measure to explore trade-offs and interdependencies 
between budget categories.
8  A disadvantage is that expressing expenditure levels in this way makes for relatively small ab-
solute numbers. This may result in optical delusions of all sorts. It needs to be kept in mind, 
therefore, that, for example, 1.38 percent of a rich country’s GDP is a huge amount of money, 
and that a decline from 1.38 to 1.09 percent is a decline of no less than 21 percent.
9  Only since 1992 has the OECD presented an indicator that includes public educational subsi-
dies to private households. They range roughly from 0.2 to 0.4 percent of GDP in Germany and 
the US. In Sweden, they add up to about 1 percent, with a tendency to decline in recent years. 
For more information see the 2010 edition of Education at a Glance (OECD 1992–2010: 186 ff.).8  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
A first inspection of the data on our three countries (Table 1) reveals that public ex-
penditure on education in Sweden has declined sharply over past decades. Although 
spending is still by far the highest among the three countries, it fell from 8.5 percent of 
GDP in 1980 to 6.1 percent in 2007, with a strikingly continuous decline of 2 percentage 
points during the 1980s. Spending in the US has remained fairly constant, fluctuating 
around 5 percent until 2007. However, two exceptional highs are found in 1991 and 
2003, when spending rose to about 5.5 percent. In both cases, the effect seems to be due 
to low economic growth (1991 and 2001–2003 were years in which the US economy 
performed poorly) combined with institutional inertia of spending commitments.10 
Germany’s spending came down from a relatively high level in the 1970s, gradually 
decreasing from 4.6 percent in 1980 to 3.9 percent in 1988. After a slight upward trend 
in 1993 to 4.5 percent, expenditure remained roughly constant before it fell to 4 percent 
in the last observed year, 2007.
10  Economic growth rates and public investment spending were negatively correlated in the ob-
served period, ranging from r = – .52 for the US to r = – .63 for Germany.
Table 1  Public spending on education, as a percentage  
of GDP, 1981–2007
Germany Sweden United States
1981 4.6 8.0 4.8
1982 4.6 7.8 4.9
1983 4.4 7.4 4.8
1984 4.1 7.2 4.6
1985 4.1 7.0 4.6
1986 4.1 7.0 4.8
1987 4.0 6.9 4.8
1988  3.9a 6.5 4.8
1989a 3.9 6.5 4.9
1990 4.0 6.5 4.9
1991 4.0 6.5 5.5
1992 3.9 6.7 5.3
1993 4.5 6.7 5.1
1994 4.5 6.6 4.9
1995 4.5 6.6 5.0
1996a 4.5 6.7 5.1
1997 4.5 6.8 5.2
1998 4.4 6.6 4.8
1999 4.3 6.5 4.9
2000 4.3 6.3 4.8
2001 4.3 6.3 5.1
2002 4.4 6.7 5.3
2003 4.4 6.5 5.4
2004 4.3 6.5 5.1
2005 4.2 6.2 4.8
2006 4.1 6.2 5.0
2007 4.0 6.1 5.0
a Estimate.
Sources: OECD Education at a Glance; OECD Public Educational 
Expenditure 1970–1988.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  9
Research and development (R&D)
In its seminal Frascati Manual, the OECD (2002: 30, 77) defines as R&D all basic re-
search, applied research and experimental development in the natural and engineering 
sciences (NSE) and in the social sciences and humanities (SSH). The most common 
measure of expenditure in these areas is GERD (Gross Domestic Expenditure on Re-
search and Development), which relies on surveys among R&D performers.11 Our indi-
cator covers government-financed R&D carried out in all national sectors (government, 
business enterprise, private non-profit, and higher education12) in a given year and is 
considered to be the most accurate way of identifying the government’s share in R&D 
financing (OECD 2002: 138).
Data for our three countries are available from 1981 onwards. Several peculiarities de-
serve special attention. For Sweden, data are compiled only for every other year since 
1981, which leaves us with gaps in the time series. As with educational data, we estimat-
ed the missing values by the arithmetical mean between the two closest years. Moreover, 
Swedish data were underestimated until 2005, mainly because smaller companies (with 
between 10 and 49 employees) were left out of the surveys. Similarly, US data do not 
include capital expenditure on R&D and are therefore also underestimated. Unfortu-
nately, better data are not available.13 Finally, tax incentives granted by governments 
in support of privately funded R&D may also have significant effects on government 
revenues, and are indeed increasingly employed by OECD countries. However, neither 
Germany nor Sweden seem to be providing such incentives, and in the United States 
tax expenditure in this area is among the lowest in the OECD world (OECD 2009c: 78).
Our data show how public spending on R&D has steadily decreased in Germany since 
the early 1980s, falling from 1.04 percent of GDP in 1982 to 0.7 percent in 2007 (Table 2). 
The development in the US from the mid-1980s to the end-1990s largely shows an even 
steeper downward trend. The increase after 2000 is driven mainly by a rise in spending 
on defense R&D (OECD 2007: 1). Beginning in 2004 we note a renewed, albeit minor 
decline. Swedish developments are more difficult to summarize, although public spend-
ing on R&D also declined over time. After spending increases throughout the 1980s, 
growth-sensitive ups and downs in the early 1990s preceded a period of relatively con-
stant expenditure. In recent years, however, spending has fallen to a low of 0.8 percent 
of GDP, to some extent paralleling the other two countries. As absolute figures are small, 
and R&D activities institutionally inert, one may expect strong short-term effects of 
changes in economic growth, with increases producing a decline and decreases produc-
ing an increase in spending as a percentage of GDP.
11  Performers are asked to indicate the source of their funds, which makes it possible to separate 
public from private funding.
12  Since public spending on R&D in the higher education sector is already included within educa-
tion spending, the possibility of double-counting deserves particular attention. We discuss this 
below when introducing our aggregate measure for soft investment.
13  The alternative approach, GBAORD (Government Budget Appropriations or Outlays on R&D), 
contains too many and too sharp statistical breaks (OECD 2010c).10  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
Active labor market policy
The data on active labor market policy cover the period from 1985 to 2007 and are 
found in the OECD Employment Database. They reflect spending on labor market 
programs included in state budgets or in the accounts of implementing institutions.14 
Active labor market policy is targeted at groups subject to certain handicaps on the 
labor market and aims at increasing their “employability.” In the narrowest sense, it 
includes the funding and provision of institutional training and of recruitment incen-
tives, employment support, vocational rehabilitation, direct job creation and, in some 
cases, job rotation schemes.15 In addition, we included spending on public employment 
services, such as counseling and case management, financial assistance with the cost 
of job search, related services for employers, and general administration costs which, 
unfortunately, cannot be separated from the costs of passive support programs. Unlike
14  Data come from ministries of labor, from agencies that provide public employment services, 
and from national statistical offices.
15  For a detailed account see: <www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/41/42116566.pdf>.
Table 2  Public spending on research and development, 
as a percentage of GDP, 1981–2007
Germany Sweden United States
1981 1.01 0.92 1.12
1982 1.04 0.96 1.18
1983 0.99 0.95 1.21
1984 0.97 0.97 1.23
1985 1.01 0.99 1.29
1986 0.98 1.02 1.26
1987 0.97 1.04 1.28
1988 0.95 1.06 1.22
1989 0.95 1.05 1.14
1990 0.90 0.97 1.10
1991 0.88 0.91 1.06
1992 0.85 0.98 1.00
1993 0.85 1.03 0.94
1994 0.82 0.98 0.89
1995 0.83 0.92 0.89
1996 0.84 0.92 0.84
1997 0.80 0.90 0.81
1998 0.79 0.93 0.79
1999 0.77 0.94 0.75
2000 0.77 0.92 0.70
2001 0.77 0.93 0.74
2002 0.79 0.93 0.76
2003 0.79 0.94 0.78
2004 0.76 0.91 0.78
2005 0.71 0.88 0.78
2006 0.70 0.84 0.76
2007 0.70 0.80 0.75
Source: OECD Research and Development Statistics.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  11
“passive” labor market policy, which replaces a worker’s wage in case of unemployment, 
active labor market policy may, like spending on education, be considered public invest-
ment in “human capital” and, perhaps, social equity.
Expenditure on active labor market policy is shown in the data set for the fiscal year in 
which measures and services are provided, even if money transfers may take place at a 
later point. In this way, policy choices that affect spending levels become immediately 
visible. Besides directly provided services and cash transfers, expenditures also include 
forgone revenue through tax reductions (Eurostat 2010).
The three countries considered in this study have different spending profiles, corre-
sponding to different program priorities (OECD 2010a: Table K). Still, there is a similar 
trend toward lower spending, although at different levels (Table 3). The most dramatic 
decline has taken place in Sweden. After a decrease in spending in the late 1980s, expen-
diture bounced back in the 1990s to reach 2.5 percent of GDP by the end of the decade. 
Thereafter, however, it declined sharply, to 1.12 percent in 2007, which is the lowest 
level in the observed period.16 Data on Germany first show a rise in spending up to 1.49 
16  To control for policy demand one may divide ALMP spending as a percentage of GDP by a coun-
try’s unemployment rate. This reveals a flat and low spending curve in the US throughout the 
observed period, whereas German spending had upswings in the late 1980s and late 1990s but 
eventually returned to the modest levels of the mid-1980s. Sweden’s adjusted spending dropped 
dramatically in the early 1990s from very high levels and moved closer to the German level.
Table 3  Public spending on active labor market policy,  
as a percentage of GDP, 1985–2007
Germany Sweden United States
1985 0.51 2.07 0.28
1986 0.75 1.96 0.26
1987 0.84 1.83 0.26
1988 0.90 1.73 0.24
1989 0.86 1.51 0.23
1990 0.88 1.64 0.24
1991 1.15 2.25 0.23
1992 1.49 2.80 0.22
1993 1.39 2.78 0.22
1994 1.18 2.82 0.21
1995 1.19 2.18 0.20
1996 1.30 2.17 0.17
1997 1.10 2.12 0.20
1998 1.17 2.46 0.20
1999 1.30 2.22 0.18
2000 1.23 1.75 0.18
2001 1.22 1.66 0.18
2002 1.24 1.58 0.17
2003 1.17 1.25 0.16
2004 1.07 1.22 0.14
2005 0.89 1.29 0.14
2006 0.86 1.36 0.13
2007 0.72 1.12 0.13
Source: OECD.Stats Database on Labour Market Programmes.12  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
percent of GDP in 1992, which is followed by continuous decline, with minor ups and 
downs, to 0.72 in 2007. In the US, spending has always been much lower than in the other 
two countries. It was comparatively constant for the first half of the observation period, 
until the late 1990s after which it steadily declined from 0.2 to 0.13 percent of GDP.
Family support
Public spending on family benefits is documented in the OECD Social Expenditure Data-
base (OECD 2010b). Family policy expenditure is defined as financial support that is spe-
cifically directed towards families and children. The data are from budgetary allocations 
of national ministries and are available from 1981 to 2007. There are three types of public 
spending on families: (1) cash benefits that include family allowances, such as child ben-
efits, income support during periods of parental leave, and childcare expenses; (2) ben-
efits in kind or services, including subsidies to providers of childcare and early education 
facilities, services for families in need, and youth assistance; and (3) financial support for 
families through the tax system, for example, via child tax allowances and credits.17
Unfortunately, the available time-series data reflect only the first two types of public 
spending. Data on tax breaks for families exist only for 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007. The 
share of family support that is provided in the form of tax breaks is considerable in 
Germany18 and the US, but nonexistent in Sweden. Tax breaks, where they are fiscally 
significant, may be affected by fiscal stress. However, since there are no cross-nationally 
comparable data on family tax credits, nor generally on the family policy dimension 
of national tax systems, public spending on family policy over a longer period can be 
documented only in terms of services and transfers. Another difficulty is posed by the 
fact that family services are often provided or co-funded by local governments whose 
spending may not be completely covered by national data. This holds true in particular 
when local entities receive general block grants from the national state. Nonetheless, the 
OECD claims that “in Nordic countries (where local government is heavily involved in 
service delivery) this does not lead to large gaps in measurement of spending” (OECD 
2009b: PF1.1). Germany and the US are not explicitly mentioned but might also be af-
fected due to their federal structure.
The development of public spending on family benefits has taken different paths in our 
three countries (Table 4). While Sweden’s spending level meandered around 4 percent of 
GDP during the 1980s, it climbed to almost 5 percent in 1992, only to fall sharply to less
17  For more detailed information, see OECD (2009b).
18  Where in 1996 cash payments under the Familienlastenausgleich were converted into tax re-
lief. By 2007, tax breaks for families amounted to 0.9 percent of GDP in Germany, which was 
roughly the same as in 2001. In comparison, tax breaks in the US fell from 0.69 in 2001 to 0.53 
percent of GDP in 2007.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  13
than 3 percent at the end of the century. In 2007, family policy expenditure again rose 
to 3.42 percent of GDP. In Germany, spending declined in the 1980s from 2 percent to 
about 1.5 percent, but then returned to roughly 2 percent after unification. Without 
much variation in the 1990s and early 2000s, expenditure amounted to 1.83 percent 
of GDP in 2007. For the US, the sum of cash and in-kind benefits never amounted to 
more than the 1980 level of 0.78 percent in the observed period. Spending levels went 
down to 0.44 percent in the late 1980s and from then on fluctuated with a peak value of 
0.78 percent in 2002, a year of low economic growth. Subsequently, it declined to 0.65 
percent in 2007.
Table 4  Public spending on family support, as a 
percentage of GDP, 1981–2007
Germany Sweden United States
1981 2.12 4.04 0.71
1982 1.90 3.83 0.65
1983 1.72 3.98 0.66
1984 1.61 3.87 0.63
1985 1.53 4.10 0.61
1986 1.55 4.10 0.44
1987 1.59 4.15 0.44
1988 1.55 4.17 0.44
1989 1.49 4.03 0.44
1990 1.69 4.42 0.47
1991 2.18 4.77 0.58
1992 2.25 4.85 0.59
1993 2.26 4.39 0.60
1994 2.15 4.30 0.60
1995 2.12 3.77 0.61
1996 2.05 3.49 0.56
1997 2.09 3.28 0.42
1998 2.02 3.29 0.75
1999 2.03 3.20 0.73
2000 2.05 2.97 0.73
2001 2.04 3.10 0.76
2002 2.14 3.20 0.78
2003 2.14 3.29 0.73
2004 2.10 3.30 0.68
2005 2.08 3.30 0.64
2006 1.78 3.45 0.65
2007 1.83 3.42 0.65
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database.14  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
Soft public investment: Aggregating education, R&D, active labor market policy,  
and family support
Our first inspection of the data on our four categories of soft investment suggests a 
common tendency toward a decline in spending. As it turns out, at least some of the 
measures of soft investment are highly correlated within countries over time.19 We take 
this to indicate that it makes sense in principle to combine the four spending categories 
into an aggregate indicator of soft public investment.
Aggregating data from different sources may be problematic. In our case, public expen-
diture on R&D performed in higher education institutions is counted under both R&D 
and education. We were, however, able to estimate the double count by identifying the 
higher education content of R&D in GERD. Similarly, government expenditure on pre-
19  The clearest results come from Sweden, where the four investment variables are correlated at 
coefficients between .29 (education and R&D) and .54 (R&D and family support). Germany 
and the US show a more mixed picture, with highly positive but also a few negative correlations.
Table 5  Soft public investment spending, as a  
percentage of GDP, 1981–2007
Germany Sweden United States
1981 7.7 13.0 6.6
1982 7.5 12.6 6.7
1983 7.1 12.3 6.7
1984 6.7 12.0 6.5
1985 6.6 12.1 6.5
1986 6.6 12.1 6.5
1987 6.6 12.1 6.5
1988 6.4 11.7 6.5
1989 6.4 11.6 6.4
1990 6.5 11.9 6.5
1991 7.1 12.2 7.1
1992 7.0 12.5 6.9
1993 7.6 12.1 6.6
1994 7.5 11.9 6.4
1995 7.4 11.3 6.5
1996 7.4 11.1 6.5
1997 7.4 11.0 6.4
1998 7.2 10.8 6.4
1999 7.1 10.6 6.4
2000 7.1 10.2 6.2
2001 7.1 10.3 6.6
2002 7.3 10.8 6.8
2003 7.3 10.7 6.9
2004 7.2 10.7 6.6
2005 7.0 10.4 6.2
2006 6.6 10.5 6.4
2007 6.5 10.3 6.4
Sources: OECD Education at a Glance; OECD Public Educational Ex-
penditure 1970–1988; OECD Research and Development Statistics; 
OECD.Stats Database on Labour Market Programmes.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  15
primary education facilities is included in education as well as family support spending. 
Although spending devoted to early childhood education is available only from 1997 on, 
it seems to have been largely constant in terms of GDP, enabling us to estimate the extent 
of double-counting over the period. Moreover, in the German case it cannot be ruled 
out that some of the public expenditure on vocational training might be counted in 
both education and active labor market policy spending.20 Finally, as already mentioned, 
spending figures on ALMP are heavily distorted by cyclical changes in unemployment. 
While we will discuss ALMP spending in the individual country sections, we have for this 
reason decided not to include it in our aggregate measure of soft investment.
Table 5 shows the three countries’ aggregate spending on education, R&D, and family 
support. In total, our estimated aggregate is on average about 10 percent too high in 
Sweden and Germany, and about 8 percent in the US. However, since there is no sharp 
break in any of the series, the distortion in all three countries is roughly the same over 
time, and therefore has no major effect on general trends (Figure 1). In Sweden, soft 
public investment declined early in the 1980s and, after a short rebound, again from 
20  Personal communication with the German national statistical office and the OECD informs us 
that there is no way of sorting this out.
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1993 onwards. Having set out at a level of 13 percent of GDP, aggregate spending de-
creased to 10.3 percent in 2007. Soft investment in Germany developed in a similar way 
on a lower level, with some decline in the 1980s, a significant increase after unification 
and, in the run-up to the crisis, another decline from 7.6 to 6.5 percent of GDP. US 
spending, as mentioned, was comparatively stable. Except for peaks in 1991 and 2003, 
which were associated with highs in education spending, US expenditure was by and 
large constant at around 6.5 percent throughout the period. In summary, soft invest-
ment spending in Germany has gradually approximated US levels, with Swedish spend-
ing moving continuously closer to the German level.
Excursus: Soft and hard investment
We will now return briefly to the definition of public investment applied in the bulk of 
the literature. At first glance one might be inclined to combine our aggregate measure 
of soft investment with the standard indicator of hard investment, which is Gross Fixed
Table 6  Hard public investment spending, as a 
percentage of GDP, 1981–2007
Germany Sweden United States
1981 3.4 5.0 2.3
1982 3.0 4.6 2.2
1983 2.8 4.5 2.1
1984 2.6 4.2 2.2
1985 2.6 3.9 2.3
1986 2.7 3.5 2.3
1987 2.6 3.3 2.4
1988 2.5 3.4 2.3
1989 2.5 3.9 2.3
1990 2.5 3.7 2.4
1991 2.6 3.6 2.5
1992 2.8 3.5 2.4
1993 2.7 3.7 2.3
1994 2.5 4.0 2.3
1995 2.2 3.9 2.3
1996 2.1 3.5 2.4
1997 1.8 3.0 2.4
1998 1.8 3.1 2.4
1999 1.9 3.1 2.4
2000 1.8 2.8 2.5
2001 1.7 2.9 2.5
2002 1.7 3.1 2.6
2003 1.6 3.0 2.5
2004 1.4 3.0 2.4
2005 1.3 3.0 2.4
2006 1.4 3.1 2.4
2007 1.4 3.1 2.4
Source: OECD National Accounts.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  17
Capital Formation by General Government (GFCF). However, while GFCF is defined 
technically according to the nature of the assets in question (OECD 2009a: 44), data on 
soft investment are defined functionally with respect to specific policy areas. Combining 
the two measures would raise highly complex issues of double-counting that cannot be 
resolved with the statistical sources at hand. Still, by taking both measurements of pub-
lic investment into account without, however, lumping them together, a more detailed 
picture of fiscal developments during the past three decades can be attained.
Indeed, what emerges overall is a striking similarity in the development of soft and 
hard investment. Hard investment decreased in Germany and Sweden, while remaining 
largely constant in the United States, the country with the lowest level at the beginning 
of the period (Table 6, Figure 2). The steepest decline took place in Germany where 
hard investment declined from 3.4 percent of GDP in 1981 to 1.4 percent in 2007. The 
long-term trend, in the course of which German hard investment fell below the Ameri-
can level, slowed down only temporarily in the years immediately after unification. In 
Sweden, expenditure on physical infrastructure dropped in the early 1980s from 5 to 3.3 
percent, and again in the mid-1990s from 4 to 3 percent of GDP, strongly resembling 
the trend in soft investment. Still, it remained clearly above American expenditure. 
Finally, in the United States hard investment spending meandered around an average of 
2.4 percent of GDP throughout the period.
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Fiscal stress
By “fiscal stress” we mean fiscal pressures for the consolidation of public finances. In 
a simplified model, we assume that stress starts with current, persistent, high and, in 
particular, rising public deficits. They result in, or add to, rising public debt. At a certain 
point, governments will face the need either to raise taxes or cut public spending. We 
suggest that this applies regardless of a country’s existing level of debt, deficit, spend-
ing or taxation, and indeed this is what the fiscal histories of our three countries over 
almost three decades bear out. Moreover, we expect fiscal pressure on discretionary 
public spending, including and in particular on public investment, to be the stronger 
the less a government, faced with high deficits and accumulating debt, is able or willing 
to raise taxes. As taxation levels in the three countries, while very different, remained 
by and large unchanged during the period of observation,21 we find it convenient to 
define fiscal stress as a combination over time of increases in deficits and debt followed 
by a decline in overall government spending. Like our dependent variables, we measure 
all three components relative to GDP (Table 7). Before we proceed we will comment 
briefly on each of the three measures.
Public deficits
Annual figures for public deficits are highly volatile as they are sensitive to changes in 
GDP, given the inertia of public spending commitments and the functioning of the wel-
fare state as an “automatic stabilizer” in periods of economic distress. We have therefore 
chosen to replace annual figures with a three-year moving average. As can be discerned 
from Table 7, ups and downs are highly correlated between the three countries. Deficits 
were high at the beginning and low at the end of the 1980s; they increased again in the 
early 1990s; fell until the end of the decade; and then went through another cycle. In 
2007, before the Great Recession, they were declining in each of our countries.22
Public debt
Public debt developed differently in the three countries. In Germany, it went up almost 
continuously until it peaked at 71 percent in 2005. By 2007, however, it had declined 
by roughly 6 percentage points. Swedish debt behaved erratically by comparison; it first 
rose to 71 percent in 1984, then declined to 46 percent in 1990, rose again to 84 percent 
in 1996, and from then on declined almost continuously to 47 percent in the year before 
the financial crisis. Public debt in the US rose steadily until 1993 (72 percent), then fell 
to 54 percent in 2001, rising again to 62 percent in 2007.
21  American taxation hovered around 27 percent of GDP; German taxation remained at roughly 
40 percent; and the Swedish tax level was about 10 percentage points above the German one. 
Between 2000 and 2007, taxation levels declined slightly in all three countries.
22  German and Swedish deficits are correlated at r = .66, Swedish and American deficits at .38.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  19
Public expenditure
In Germany, government spending as a percentage of GDP moved between 43 and 
48 percent and then jumped to a peak of above 50 in the mid-1990s.23 In subsequent 
years, it remained at about 48 percent until it was gradually reduced after 2003 to be-
low 44 percent, the lowest level since 1989. Swedish public expenditure increased from 
63 percent in 1981 to 71 percent in 1993, to be cut in the next one-and-a-half decades 
to 52 percent, the lowest level in the entire period. Public spending in the United States 
was much lower than in the other two countries and remained roughly constant at a 
little above a third of GDP.
23  It is worth mentioning that the jump to peak value in 1995 can be explained mainly by the 
inclusion of capital transfers resulting from the takeover of the debt of the Treuhandanstalt and 
the housing industry of the former GDR.
Table 7  Indicators of fiscal stress, as a percentage of GDP, 1981–2007
Germany Sweden United States
Deficit Debt Expend. Deficit Debt Expend. Deficit Debt Expend.
1981 –3.4 33.6 47.5 –5.7 55.3 62.9 –3.3 40.9 34.7
1982 –3.4 36.5 47.5 –5.5 65.5 65.0 –4.3 45.8 37.0
1983 –2.8 38.2 46.6 –4.9 69.5 64.9 –5.2 48.8 37.1
1984 –2.0 39.0 45.8 –3.9 70.8 62.3 –5.2 50.5 36.2
1985 –1.4 39.5 45.1 –2.3 70.3 63.2 –5.1 55.3 36.9
1986 –1.4 39.6 44.4 –0.2 69.6 60.7 –5.0 58.8 37.4
1987 –1.6 40.9 45.0 2.1 61.9 58.5 –4.5 60.5 37.2
1988 –1.2 41.4 44.6 3.3 55.5 58.0 –3.8 61.2 36.3
1989 –1.3 39.8 43.1 3.3 50.4 60.0 –3.8 61.5 36.2
1990 –1.6 40.4 43.6 2.2 46.3 59.8 –4.2 63.0 37.2
1991 –2.4 37.7 46.1 –1.9 55.0 61.1 –5.1 67.8 38.0
1992 –2.8 40.9 47.3 –6.7 73.4 69.4 –5.3 70.2 38.6
1993 –2.6 46.2 48.3 –9.7 78.2 70.6 –4.9 71.8 38.1
1994 –5.0 46.5 47.9 –9.2 82.5 68.4 –4.0 71.0 37.1
1995 –5.1 55.7 54.8 –6.6 81.1 65.1 –3.1 70.6 37.1
1996 –5.2 58.8 49.3 –4.1 84.4 63.0 –2.2 69.8 36.6
1997 –2.7 60.3 48.3 –1.4 83.0 60.7 –1.0 67.4 35.4
1998 –2.1 62.2 48.1 0.0 82.0 58.8 0.0 64.1 34.6
1999 –0.8 61.5 48.2 1.8 73.2 58.6 0.8 60.4 34.2
2000 –1.0 60.4 45.1 2.0 64.3 55.4 0.5 54.5 33.9
2001 –1.7 59.7 47.5 1.2 62.7 55.2 –1.0 54.4 35.0
2002 –3.5 62.1 48.0 –0.4 60.2 56.4 –3.2 56.8 35.9
2003 –3.8 65.3 48.4 –0.8 59.3 56.5 –4.5 60.1 36.3
2004 –3.7 68.7 47.3 0.4 59.2 55.1 –4.2 61.1 36.0
2005 –2.9 71.1 46.9 1.5 59.9 54.7 –3.3 61.4 36.2
2006 –1.6 69.2 45.3 2.6 52.8 53.6 –2.7 60.9 36.0
2007 –0.7 65.3 43.6 2.9 47.4 51.8 –2.5 61.9 36.8
Notes: Deficit is the three-year moving average of annual budgetary balances, calculated 
as the mean of deficits occurring in t–1, t, and t+1. Debt reflects gross liabilities, and Ex-
penditure is defined as total disbursements of general government. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 87.20  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
5 Results
We will now present our results, first for each country separately and then, in the con-
cluding section, for the three countries in comparison.
Germany
In the 1980s, soft investment declined along with deficits and overall spending, while 
debt remained basically constant at roughly 40 percent (Figure 3). After unification, soft 
investment increased sharply, together with public deficits, spending, and debt. From 
the mid-1990s onwards, investment was cut back while deficits, spending, and debt were 
reduced, in part significantly. Subsequently, rising deficits caused an increase in overall 
debt and allowed for a slight rise in public expenditure. Then, the Schröder reforms 
and the austerity measures of the Grand Coalition (after 2005) cut the deficit by cutting 
spending and, on the eve of the financial crisis, managed to lower the national debt by 
roughly 6 percentage points. During the same period, soft public investment, by our 
aggregate measure, declined from 7.3 to 6.5 percent of GDP, that is, by about 10 percent.
Figure 3  Germany: Soft public investment, public deficits, public debt



































Sources: OECD Education at a Glance; OECD Public Educational Expenditure 1970–1988;  
OECD Research and Development Statistics; OECD.Stats Database on Labour Market 
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As already mentioned, spending on active labor market policy developed the same way; 
in fact, it was almost cut in half between 1999 and 2007 (Table 3). This was clearly not 
driven by a decline in policy demand, as the number of unemployed increased from 
about 3 to 4.5 million between 1999 and 2005. Spending on family support was also cut 
as part of the consolidation effort and declined faster in the years before the crisis than 
the population of children under 15, although arguably the decline of the latter should 
have called forth an increase in policy effort.
Sweden
Soft public investment declined steadily and dramatically during the entire period 
(Figure 4). There were two phases of budget consolidation and debt reduction, from 
1981 to 1989 and from 1995 to 2007. Especially in the latter, overall public spending was 
sharply curtailed. In the course of drastic spending cuts and a return to the Swedish tra-
dition of running a budget surplus, soft investment spending fell from 12.5 percent of 
GDP in 1992 to 10.3 percent in 2007, which amounts to a loss of no less than 18 percent. 
Simultaneously, active labor market policy was cut in half between 1998 (2.46 percent) 
and 2007 (1.12 percent), remarkably in spite of the fact that, from the early 2000s on, 
unemployment increased steadily from 190,000 to 300,000 and seems to have stabilized 
Figure 4  Sweden: Soft public investment, public deficits, public debt





































Sources: OECD Education at a Glance; OECD Public Educational Expenditure 1970–1988;  
OECD Research and Development Statistics; OECD.Stats Database on Labour Market 
Programmes; OECD Economic Outlook Database 87.
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at that level. Spending on passive labor market policy followed the same pattern. Family 
support was also severely cut during the 1990s while the number of children and the 
birth rate, perhaps in part as a result, fell slightly.
United States
Soft public investment as defined in this study was low throughout the period and 
moved between 6 and 7 percent of GDP (Figure 5). Over time, there were two epi-
sodes in which soft investment increased slightly, culminating in 1991 (7.1 percent) and 
2003 (6.9 percent). They were associated with rising deficits and growing debt. There 
were also two periods of decline, from 1991 to 2000 (6.2 percent) and from 2003 to 
2007 (6.4 percent); these were years of budget consolidation, in particular the late 1990s 
when the US budget showed a surplus. Spending on active labor market policy, small 
as it has always been in the United States, declined steadily between 1997 and 2007, al-
though the number of unemployed went up sharply between 2000 and 2003.
Figure 5  United States: Soft public investment, public deficits, 





































Sources: OECD Education at a Glance; OECD Public Educational Expenditure 1970–1988;  
OECD Research and Development Statistics; OECD.Stats Database on Labour Market 
Programmes; OECD Economic Outlook Database 87.
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6  Democratic state capacity in decline
Public deficits generate accumulating public debt, which in turn gives rise to pressures 
for fiscal consolidation. In the absence of an increase in taxation, consolidation must 
be achieved by cuts in expenditure. Inevitably, these will affect discretionary more than 
mandatory spending. Since public investment is discretionary, it is highly likely to be 
cut if public expenditure is cut. Apparently, this applies not just to traditional public 
investment in physical infrastructure, but also to what we have called “soft” investment, 
even though its magnitude may seem small in absolute terms. If governments want or 
need to pursue fiscal consolidation, protecting or, as arguably needed, increasing soft 
investment appears to be impossible without higher taxes.
Obviously, the mechanism we have identified is not a logically necessary one. As we have 
found it at work in three otherwise very different countries, however, we have become 
convinced that it does represent a powerful tendency inherent in mature democratic 
polities and their fiscal regimes. It certainly need not be the case that fiscal consolida-
tion without higher taxes depresses future-oriented public investment. To show that it 
could be otherwise one requires no more, but also no less, than one or two examples 
of countries where a decline in overall public spending went together with constant 
or even increasing soft investment. Once such cases have been discovered it will be a 
worthwhile theoretical exercise to identify the conditions that have made them different.
Our conclusion that fiscal consolidation and stable or increasing soft public investment 
are unlikely to be compatible is confirmed indirectly by the recent fiscal history of an-
other rich democracy, the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom seems to be one of 
the very few major countries in which soft investment increased rather than declined in 
the years before 2008, more precisely after “New Labour” took office in 1997 (Figure 6). 
However, this coincided with growing public expenditure funded by increasing deficits 
and rising public debt. Between 1981 and 1989, by comparison, public expenditure in 
the UK was cut, in an effort to eliminate deficits and reduce public indebtedness without 
raising taxes, and as we would expect soft public investment declined by more than a fifth.
If, as we do, one considers the decade before 2008 a trial run for a new wave of even 
more incisive consolidation of public finances in rich democracies, one cannot but ar-
rive at dire predictions concerning the future capacities of governments to assist their 
societies in coping with changed conditions of prosperity and equality. If governments 
cannot protect public investment against fiscal pressures, including in particular what 
we call soft investment, their impact on the structure of modern societies must decline. 
In response to what appears to be a further step in the gradual demise of the govern-
ing capacities of democratic states, citizens may continue to lose interest in democratic 
politics. Instead of contributing to the provision of collective goods, they will in grow-
ing numbers turn to private markets to supply themselves with what they need to sur-
vive and prosper in a changing economic opportunity structure. Not everybody will, 
however, be able to pay the price for private as opposed to public enhancement of his 24  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
or her marketability. Not only reduced welfare state spending, but also lower public 
investment is thus bound to have distributional consequences. For example, declining 
or stagnant family support will leave unchanged the initial distribution of life chances 
for the next generation, as conditioned by the social status of families. Also, declining 
investment in public education will force individuals from disadvantaged social groups 
– who will be increasingly numerous – to forgo opportunities for social advancement, or 
incur significant amounts of private debt,24 provided they have access to credit in the 
first place. Here as elsewhere, as democratic states suffer a loss of capacity to intervene 
in the social distribution of life chances, they may with good reason be considered less 
and less democratic.
24  As a result of reduced public support for education, together with rising costs of tuition in the 
private college market, the total debt of American households on college loans now equals total 
American debt on credit cards (Lewin 2011).
Figure 6  United Kingdom: Soft public investment, public deficits, 
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7 Conclusions
Fiscal stress and pressures for fiscal consolidation are bound to affect discretionary 
more than mandatory spending. Although public investment comprises only part of 
a state’s discretionary spending, we have found that it is not at all protected from the 
constraints imposed by fiscal stress on public policy. Importantly, as we have seen, this 
holds not just for public investment in the traditional sense, which is spending on the 
physical infrastructure, but also for spending on education, families, R&D, and active 
labor market policy – which we have called “soft investment” and which is, for good 
reasons, seen as the most future-oriented part of public spending. Moreover, it appears 
that, unlike what one might have expected, there seems to be no substitution of soft for 
hard investment, as apparently the two tend to be equally and simultaneously affected 
by fiscal stress and political austerity.
Remarkably, public investment seems to be declining under fiscal stress in otherwise 
very different countries with very different fiscal traditions and levels of public spend-
ing – in the present case represented by a triad including the ultimate Anglo-American 
“free market” economy, the paradigmatic example of Scandinavian social democracy, 
and the economically and politically most important continental European country. 
That our findings for the three countries are essentially the same makes them all the 
more alarming. In fact, comparison between the three countries suggests that public 
investment may be likely to decline most where original spending levels were high, and 
least where spending was already initially so low that it could not easily be lowered fur-
ther. Thought through to the end, our results might raise the question of convergence 
on the lowest possible level of collective investment.
Traditional – “hard” – public investment may be subject to saturation in advanced in-
dustrial countries. Clearly the same cannot be said of soft investment. Research and 
development is today a major source of economic progress and prosperity; education 
serves to enable a country’s citizens to participate fully in the social life of an evolving 
“knowledge society,” and compete successfully in a global economy; active labor market 
policy assists the weakest members of society to build up and maintain occupational 
competences and thereby helps equalize social and economic life-chances; and family 
policies are supposed to counter the gaping demographic deficit typical of contempo-
rary rich societies. Moreover, education and labor market policy in particular are of 
special significance in countries with high levels of immigration, like the three covered 
by this paper. Rather than a decline in soft investment spending, one would therefore 
have had good reasons to expect an increase, in response to rising needs for public 
intervention and political problem-solving, and actually this is what much of current 
political rhetoric, at least in Europe, does not tire of demanding and, indeed, promis-
ing. As we have shown, in fact the opposite is happening as fiscal stress gets worse, and 26  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
not just in the United States but also in a country such as Sweden, the archetype of the 
“Scandinavian model.”25
The results of our analysis bear out our claim that comparing trajectories over time is 
at least as productive in social and political science as are cross-sectional snapshots. A 
cross-sectional approach would have revealed that in 2007 Sweden spent a lot more on 
soft investment than Germany, and Germany spent more than the US. While this is un-
doubtedly the case, for assessing what the three spending levels really mean, and in what 
direction the three countries may be going, it is essential to understand that in all three 
of them soft investment has declined, especially in recent years when public spending 
was cut after a period of public sector deficits and an accompanying increase in public 
debt. As social and political change normally proceeds gradually, through trends rather 
than events, a longitudinal as opposed to a cross-sectional perspective suggests that we 
should search for underlying, lasting causes of the developments we have found, other 
than one-time policy decisions, changes in government, or momentary conjunctural 
circumstances. It also suggests that for a country such as Sweden, where soft public in-
vestment has for more than a decade now been on a descent toward “normalization” on 
a continental European, perhaps a German level, defending its traditional social-dem-
ocratic identity would require nothing short of a major political-economic turnaround, 
even though it may for another decade exhibit significantly higher public spending 
than, for example, Germany – which in turn will, in the absence of major political 
change, continue to descend toward the American level.
Another issue in regard to which the comparative analysis of trends over time yields im-
portant insights is taxation. Cross-sectional observation would suggest that the United 
States could easily solve its fiscal problems by raising its taxes by a few percentage points, 
to a level that would still remain far short even of the German one. The fact, however, 
that in all three countries the level of taxation declined in the 2000s, including in the 
traditional high-tax economy and society of Sweden, warns against analytical and po-
litical voluntarism. Obviously, taxation levels are sticky for whatever political or insti-
tutional reasons, and if they have changed in recent years, the change was downward 
rather than upward. Why this was so must remain a matter of debate that can certainly 
not be resolved here. Apparently, resistance to tax increases has been widespread in rich 
industrialized countries since the 1970s, when the end of the postwar growth period 
registered with citizens, and “bracket creep” could no longer be relied upon to provide 
states with a rising share in their societies’ economic resources, enabling them to dis-
charge their growing functions in ever more complex and demanding societies. Since 
then, deficits were for some time relied upon by governments to cover endemic gaps 
25  This assumes that lower spending in relation to a country’s GDP means both lower effort and 
lower effect. As to the former, we believe that, just like firms with high turnover, countries with 
a large economy require more investment, so shares are a better measure of investment effort 
than absolutes. Concerning the latter, we find it unlikely that expenditure cuts will, as a rule, 
result in efficiency gains balancing the loss of funding.Streeck, Mertens: Fiscal Austerity and Public Investment  27
between revenue and spending, until this was no longer feasible. Subsequently, consoli-
dation was sought, not by tax increases but by spending cuts, and this was the case not 
just in the US but also in social-democratic Sweden and centrist continental European 
Germany.
None of this bodes well for the coming years when the additional debt accumulated in 
the course of the financial crisis will have to be cut back under the watchful eyes of the 
very “financial markets” that caused the global recession in the first place and thereby 
forced governments to sacrifice the gains of a decade of fiscal consolidation. Further re-
ductions in public spending have already been announced in all major industrial coun-
tries, along the pattern of the 1990s and 2000s, only on a much larger scale. On the basis 
of our findings, it seems very hard to believe that this should not include a continuation 
of the cuts in public investment that we have observed in the past two-and-a-half de-
cades. The question this will raise – and, we expect, louder than ever before – is whether 
democratic states under capitalism, with their manifold public responsibilities on the 
one hand and the severe restrictions on the other under which they must raise the 
means needed to discharge them, will still be able to do what is required for the future 
viability of their increasingly unstable, fragile, and disorganized societies. Will what ap-
pears to be urgently needed also be possible? Will, in the coming years, the politically 
possible systematically fall short of the socially necessary? Will the political capacity of 
modern states be up to their increasing number of tasks, or will it atrophy under ever 
tightening conditions of fiscal austerity? There is as yet little to see to make us optimistic 
about the answer.28  MPIfG Discussion Paper 11/12
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